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IV. ABRAHAM WEISS AS EXEGETE
AND TEXT CRITIC
The Case of b. Berakot 35a
Roger Brooks
Brown University

and

Joseph M. Davis
Jewish Theological Seminary of America

ABSTRACT

)
The exegesis of the late Abraham Weiss, Yeshiva University, is
grounded in his perception of logical gaps and inconsistencies in the
text of the Talmud. Weiss thus allows the text itself to generate its own
exegetical problems, and he uses other rabbinic materials and manuscript evidence to help solve them. 1

Abraham Weiss spent the bulk of his scholarly career as Professor of
Talmud at Yeshiva University, 2 where he wrote numerous articles and
books on the development of the Talmud.3 Weiss's material is marked by
great attention to the Talmud's internal evidence of its formation. For
the most part, he is not interested in the mere validation of a priori
theories.4 This paper provides one example of Weiss's exegesis, that of
the opening unit of b. Berakot, Chapter Six. In order to place Weiss's
comments in context, we shall first translate and outline the entire pericope. With the text firmly in hand, we shall summarize Weiss's comments, and provide a brief critique.
1 Mr. Davis prepared the translation and outline of the relevant texts, b. Berakot 35a.
The analysis of Weiss's comments was written by Mr. Brooks.
- For full information on Weiss's career, see "Prof. Abraham Weiss—A Biographical
Sketch," The A. Weiss Jubilee Volume, English section, pp. 1-5.
3 See Benjamin Weiss, "Rabbi A.-Weiss's Bibliography," ibid., Hebrew section, pp. 5-11.
4 See Shammai Kanter, in J. Neusner, ed., The Formation of Babylonian Talmud,
(Leiden: 1970), pp. 87-88. Also, see Charles Primus, in J. Neusner, The Modern Study of
the Mishnah (Leiden: 1973), p. 197.
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1. Translation
Joseph M. Davis

Mishnah Berakot 6:1
A. What blessings does one say over fruit?
Over fruit of the tree one says, "[Blessed art Thou, O
Lord our God, King of the Universe], Who created
the fruit of the tree,"
C. except wine, over which one says, " . . . Who created
the fruit of the vine."
D. Over that which grows from the ground one says,
" . . . Who created the fruit of the ground,"
E. except bread, over which one says, " . . . Who brings
forth bread from the earth."

Babylonian Talmud: Berakot 35a
A. [The gemara begins with a question that forms the basis of the
entire pericope.] From what [Scriptural verse can we derive] the
law [that one is required to say a blessing before eating]?
B. [A tannaitic saying derives the law that one must say blessings
both before and after eating from Lev 19:24:] We have learned:
[It is written concerning produce of the fourth year of a plant's
growth, "All its fruit shall be] holy [worthy of] praisegiving unto
the Lord."
C. This teaches that one is required to say a blessing before and
after eating [that fourth year produce]. [The saying interprets
"praisegiving" as specifically referring to blessings. Since the
Hebrew word for "praisegiving" [hlwlym] is plural, it means two
blessings: one before eating, and one after.]
D. [R. Aqiba now generalizes the conclusion.] On this basis,
R. Aqiba said, "A man is forbidden to taste anything at all
before he has said a blessing over it." [We thus have concluded
that the law of blessings over food is derived from the word
"praisegiving" in Lev 19:24.]
E. [The gemara now objects to this conclusion. The law that one
must say blessings over food cannot be based on the word
"praisegiving," because, as we shall see at F-H, there are
other laws that must be derived from that word. The gemara
assumes that only one law can be derived from any word in
Scripture (two laws from a word in its plural form). Another
law derived from "praisegiving" therefore would leave no
room for the interpretation offered above, at B.] And do these
words, "holy, [worthy of] prasegiving [to the Lord] (qds
hlwlym)" mean [to teach that one must say blessings over
food]? [Surely] they are required [as the basis for two other
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interpretations, now presented at F-H.]
[The two interpretations are based on the similarity between
two words hll, to praise, and hll, to redeem or desanctify.
Food that is in certain minor states of holiness—and in particular fourth year produce—may be redeemed by its owner for
its value in cash. The money takes on the sacred character of
the food, and the food becomes desanctified and may be
eaten forthwith. The first interpretation is as follows:] [In
using the word "praisegiving" (hlwlym) it is as if] the Merciful
One said, "Redeem it [i.e. fourth year produce] ('hlyh) and
then eat it ('klyh)." [The pay on 'hlyh and 'klyh is irrelevant to
this interpretation.]
G. [We now present a second interpretation. It seeks to use the
word "praisegiving" to show that the laws of the fourth year
produce apply only to wine. Only wine had songs of praise (hll)
sung over it when it was offered on the altar of the Temple in
Jerusalem, cf. H. Only wine, therefore, requires redemption
(Ml) from the status of fourth year produce, or is subject to the
laws of fourth year produce at all:] That which requires a song
[of praise—wine—] requires redemption (hlwl) [and is thus subject to the laws of fourth year produce]. That which does not
require a song [of praise—everything except wine—] does not
require redemption [and is exempt from the laws of fourth year
produce].
H. [We now provide Scriptural evidence that only wine required a
song of praise when it was offered on the altar.] And it is as
R. Samuel b. Nahmani taught in the name of R. Jonathan. For
R. Samuel b. Nahmani taught in the name of R. Jonathan,
"From what [Scriptural verse can we learn] that they sang songs
[of praise at the altar] only over [offerings of] wine? As it is written [in Judg 9:13], 'And the vine said to them, "Shall I leave my
wine, which makes God and men joyful?"' Granted that wine
makes men joyful. But how does it make God joyful? [It must be
through the songs of praise that were sung over the wineofferings at the altar.] It follows from this that they sang songs of
praise at the altar only over the wine-offerings."
I. [B-H therefore bring us to the following point. We have three
interpretations, each of which bases a different law on the word
"praisegiving" in Lev 19:24. The first (B-D) derives the law that
one must say blessings before and after eating. The second (F)
derives the law that fourth year produce may be redeemed and
eaten. The third (G-H) derives the restriction that only wine is
subject to the law of fourth year produce. But the existence of
these three distinct interpretations posed a problem, as we saw
F.
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earlier, at E. It is assumed that no more than a single law may be
based on a single word in Scripture. To accept one of the interpretations, therefore, is to reject the other two, and leaves those
laws, then, without a basis in Scripture. The gemara now sets
out to solve this problem as best it can.] If one takes the position
that all crops [and not just wine] are subject to the law of fourth
year produce, then there is no problem. [Because then one will
not need the interpretation of "praisegiving" that restricted the
law of fourth year produce to wine. The other two interpretations both may be based on this word, because it is plural. On
one "praisegiving" we base the first law; on the other "praisegiving" the second.]
[But this is only a partial solution. We object:] But for the one
who takes the position that only wine is subject to the laws of
fourth year produce, what is there to say? [He has a problem,
because he requires all three interpretations of "praisegiving."
While two laws may be derived from "praisegiving" (cf. I) three
may not.]
[K does not advance the discussion but merely supplies a dispute
between tannaim concerning whether the law of fourth year
produce applies to all crops or only to wine.] As we have
learned: R. Hiyya and R. Simeon b. Rabbi—one held the position that only wine is subject to the law of fourth year produce,
and the other held the position that all crops are subject to the
law of fourth year produce.
[The gemara now presents a solution to the problem posed at J.]
There is no problem for the one who takes the position that only
wine is subject to the law of fourth year produce, if he bases his
view on a gezerah shavah. [A gezerah shavah is a particular
mode of interpretation of Scripture. The connotations of a word
as it is used in one context in Scripture are transferred to the
same word used in a different context elsewhere in Scripture. If
one bases on a gezerah shavah the position that only wine is
subject to the law of fourth year produce, then one will not need
to base that position on the word "praisegiving." Thus he will no
longer be deriving too many laws from that word.]
[We now present the gezerah shavah on which we can base the
law that only wine is subject to the law of fourth year produce.]
As we have learned: Rabbi said, "It is written [in connection
with the law of fourth year produce, Lev 19:25] 'to increase for
you its produce (tbw'tw)'; and it is written elsewhere [Deut
22:9], 'and the produce (wtbw't) of the vineyard.' Just as in the
latter verse [the word 'produce' specifically means the produce
of a] vineyard, so too in the former verse [the word 'produce'
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must mean only the produce of a] vineyard." [Thus, by use of a
gezerah shavah, we have derived the restriction that the only
produce subject to the law of the fourth year of growth is the
produce of a vineyard, namely wine.]
Therefore there is one "praisegiving" left [from which to derive
the law that one must say] blessings [before and after eating.]
[There are, as we said, two "praisegivings" available to be interpreted. If we use the gezerah shavah as the basis of the restriction to wine of the law of fourth year produce, then there is one
"praisegiving" left over, which can be used as the basis of the
requirement to say blessings over food.]
But if one does not accept the gezerah shavah, then from what
[Scriptural verse can one derive the law that one must say] blessings [over food]? [Without the gezerah shavah, one is forced
back into basing too many laws on the word "praisegiving." No
answer is given to this objection. The gemara moves on to
another objection.]
And even if one does accept the gezerah shavah, then [still only
the requirement to say a blessing] after [eating] can be derived
[from Scripture.] From what [Scriptural verse can one derive the
requirement to say a blessing] before [eating]? [At I and again at
N, we had based on a single "praisegiving" the law that one
must say blessings over food. The gemara now objects: from a
single "praisegiving" one cannot derive two blessings. Only one
blessing can be derived; that is assumed to be the blessing after
eating.]
[An answer is given to the question just proposed.] This is no
problem. [Although only the blessing after eating can be
derived directly from Scripture, the requirement of saying a
blessing before eating] can be derived by a qal vehomer. [A qal
vehomer is a deduction from a weaker to a stronger case, a
minor i a ma jus.]
If one says a blessing [after eating], when he is full, then how
much more so should he say a blessing [before eating] when he is
still hungry? [If one acknowledges God when one's needs are
satisfied, then how much more should one acknowledge Him
when one is still in need of His aid.]
[But we now raise another objection. From Lev 19:24] we may
derive [only the law that one must say blessings before and
after drinking] wine. [For if we accept the gezerah shavah at
L, then we must interpret the whole verse as referring only to
wine, and the law of blessings, which we derived from the
verse, as likewise referring only to wine.] From what [Scriptural source can we derive the requirement to say blessings
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before and after eating] other kinds [of food, except wine]?
[We attempt to answer the question by comparing wine to all
other food.] We derive [the law that all food requires blessings]
from [the fact that] wine [does]. Just as wine is something that is
enjoyed, and requires blessings, so too everything that is enjoyed
[that is, all food] requires blessings.
[This answer, however, proves too much. By this logic, wine and
all other food would be subject to the same laws in all cases. But
we know this is not true. So we object: Surely] we can make a
distinction [between wine and other food]. Wine [—kerem, literally a vineyard—] is distinguished in that it is subject to the
law of defective clusters [(cf. Deut 24:21), but other food is not.
Perhaps only that which is subject to the law of defective clusters—i.e. wine—is subject to the law of blessings.]
[We answer:] [The case of] standing grain will prove [that the
law of blessings is not restricted only to things subject to the law
of defective clusters. For standing grain is not subject to the law
of defective clusters, but we know that one is required to say a
blessing after eating it, since Deut 8:9-10 states, "You shall eat
bread without scarceness . . . and you will eat and be satisfied
and bless the Lord your God."]
[But we now object: How can standing grain be compared to all
other food?] Standing grain is distinguished [from other food] in
that it is subject to the law of dough-offering [(cf. Num 15:21)
but other food is not]. [Perhaps only that which is subject to the
law of dough-offerings is subject to the law of blessings.]
[And we answer:] Wine proves [that this is not so. Wine requires
blessings, but is not subject to the law of dough-offerings.]
And so the argument turns full circle. The characteristics [of
wine] are not like the characteristics [of standing grain] and the
characteristics [of standing grain] are not like the characteristics
[of wine],
What [wine and bread] have in common is that both are things
that are enjoyed and require blessings. Therefore, everything
that is enjoyed must require blessings. [Thus, while we could not
generalize from the case of either wine or bread individually to
the case of all kinds of food, we now suggest that perhaps we
can make that generalization from the case of wine and bread
in combination.]
[But we object: wine and bread, even in combination, can be
distinguished from other kinds of food.] That which [wine and
bread] have in common is that they were offered on the altar [in
the Temple.] [Perhaps it is only those kinds of foods that could
be offered on the altar that require blessing.]
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[BB-DD move away from the main stream of argument to discuss the question of how we may derive from Scripture the
requirement to say blessings over olive oil. We work within the
supposition just proposed at AA, that those kinds of foods that
could be offered on the altar require blessings. So we begin by
suggesting:] Therefore, olive oil [would require a blessing]
because it was offered on the altar.
[But we object:] Do we have to derive [the law that] olive oil
[requires blessings] from the fact that it was offered on the altar?
Does not [Scripture explicitly] call [both olive orchards and vineyards] kerem? [And therefore can we not make a direct inference that just as the produce of vineyards requires blessings, so
too does the produce of olive orchards?] As it is written [Judg
15:5] "And it burnt both the shocks and the standing grain,
together with the olive orchards (kerem zayit)."
Answered R. Papa, "[Olive orchards] may be called kerem
zayit, but they are never called simply kerem." [Therefore
olives are not governed by laws applying to kerem, a vineyard.
We must derive the requirement to say blessings over olive oil
from the fact that it was offered on the altar.]
[The gemara now returns to the main stream of the argument,
restating the question posed earlier at A A.] In any case, we still
have a problem. [Wine and bread, and even olive oil] have in
common that they were offered on the altar. [But how do we
know that one is required to say a blessing over those kinds of
foods not offered on the altar?]
[We propose an answer.] Rather, we derive [the law that one is
required to say blessings over all kinds of food] from [the
requirement of saying blessings over] the "seven kinds." [The
"seven kinds" are the seven foods mentioned at Deut 8:8, wheat,
barley, wine, figs, pomegranates, olive oil, and date honey. At
V, we interpreted Deut 8:10, "And you will eat and be satisfied
and bless the Lord your God," as referring only to the bread
mentioned in Deut 8:9. We now interpret it as referring to all
seven kinds mentioned in 8:8.] Just as the "seven kinds" are
things that are enjoyed and require blessings, so too everything
that is enjoyed, [all food], should require blessings.
[But as at T, we have now proved too much. By the same logic,
the "seven kinds" and all other food would be subject to the
same laws in all cases. We object:] The "seven kinds" are distinguished in that they are subject to the law of firstfruits. [Other
food is not. Perhaps only food subject to the law of firstfruits is
subject to the law of blessings. There is no answer, and we move
on to another objection.]
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Furthermore, granted that [we may derive the requirement of
saying a blessing] after [eating, from the explicit verse Deut
8:10], from what [Scriptural verse can one derive the requirement to say a blessing] before [eating? Deut 8:10 speaks only of
saying a blessing after eating.]
[We asked a very similar question at P. We give the answer that
we gave at Q.] The requirement of saying a blessing before eating is derived from a qal vehomer: if one says a blessing [after
eating] when he is full, then how much more so should he say a
blessing [before eating] when he is still hungry?
[We now back up the unanswered objection at GG with a further objection. At I, we said that there is no problem for the one
who holds that all planted crops, and not just wine, are subject
to the law of fourth year produce. We now raise an objection to
that.] And for the one who takes the position that all planted
crops are subject to the law of fourth year produce, there is no
problem in saying that planted crops require blessings. But
whence does he derive the law that one is required to say blessings over food that is not planted, for example meat or eggs or
fish? [As at S, if the requirement to say blessings over food is
based on "praisegiving" then it can govern only those kinds of
foods spoken of at Lev 19:24, namely planted crops—those
kinds of food subject to the law of fourth year produce.]
We answer the objections at GG and JJ together.] Rather, [the
extension to all food of the requirement of saying blessings is
based on] a reasonable supposition: that a person is forbidden to
derive any benefit from this world without saying a blessing.
2. Outline
Joseph M. Davis

I. A.

B.

1. Question: What is the Scriptural basis for the law that one
must say a blessing before eating?
2. Answer: The law is based on the word hlwlym in Lev
19:24. Hlwlym, praisegiving, is used in that verse as an
epithet of fourth year produce. It is interpreted as meaning
requiring blessings.
Objection to the answer of A.2. The word hlwlym cannot be
used as a basis for the law that one must say a blessing
before eating, because it is needed as the basis for two
other laws, namely:
1. The law that fourth year produce may be redeemed.
2. The law that only wine is subject to the restrictions of
fourth year produce.
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Two solutions to the objection of B, and one rejected potential
solution to that objection.
1. First solution: We may reject the law that only wine is subject to the restrictions of fourth year produce, and take the
contrary position. We will then have only two laws, one of
which is the law of saying a blessing before eating, to be
based on hlwlym. Since hlwlym is plural, it may be used as
the basis for both laws.
2. Second solution: Or we may accept that only wine is subject
to the laws of fourth year produce, but base that law not on
hlwlym, but on the word tbw'tw in the same verse. Once
again, we will have only two laws based on hlwlym; one of
them is the law that one must say a blessing before eating.
3. Rejected potential solution: But we cannot both accept the
law that only wine is subject to the restrictions of fourth
year produce, and also base that law on hlwlym, because
then we would be deriving too many laws from hlwlym.
Two objections to the second solution (C.2).
1. The first objection is answered quickly.
(a)Objection: One can derive from hlwlym only the law that
one must say a blessing after eating, not before eating.
(b)The requirement of saying a blessing before eating may
be deduced logically. If one says a blessing after eating,
when he is full, will he not say a blessing when he is still
hungry?
2. The second objection provokes a long series of rebuttals and
further objections. There are six objections in the series, five
of which are answered by rebuttals. The fifth, or next to the
last, is not answered until the end of the pericope (F). After
the fourth objection in the series, there is a discursus and the
objection has to be repeated.
(a)l. Objection: One can derive from hlwlym only the law
that one must say blessings over wine, not over other
food.
2. Rebuttal: Wine is like all other food in that both wine
and other food give pleasure. If wine requires blessings,
then all food must require blessings.
(b)l. Objection: But wine is unlike all other food in that it is
subject to the law of defective clusters, but other food is
not. Perhaps only that which is subject to the law of
defective clusters is subject to the law of blessings.
2. Rebuttal: That cannot be, because bread, which is not
subject to the law of defective clusters, requires blessings (cf, Deut 8:9-10).
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(c)l. Objection: But not all food is like bread. Perhaps only
food that is subject to the law of dough-offerings is
subject to the law of blessings.
2. Rebuttal: That cannot be, because wine is not subject to
the law of dough-offerings, and it requires blessings.
(d)l. Objection: Wine and bread have in common that they
were offered on the altar. But not all kinds of food were
offered on the altar. Perhaps only those kinds of food
that were offered on the altar require blessings.
2. Discursus: How should the requirement of saying blessings over olive oil be derived from Scripture?
(a) It can be derived from the fact that olive oil was
offered on the altar.
(b)Objection to (a): There is a better way to derive the
requirement. Kerem means both vineyard and olive
orchard; therefore, the law of blessings, which
applies to the produce of a kerem, should apply
equally to olive oil as to wine.
(c)Rebuttal to (b): Kerem means vineyard; kerem zayit
means olive orchard.
3. The objection at 1 is repeated: Perhaps only those
kinds of food that were offered on the altar require
blessings.
4. Rebuttal: The seven kinds of food mentioned in Deut
8:8-10 all require blessings, but not all of them were
offered on the altar.
(e)Objection: Perhaps only food that is subject to the law of
firstfruits requires blessing. Wine and bread and olive oil
and the seven kinds of food in Deut 8:8-10 are all subject
to the law of firstfruits, but not all food is.
(f) 1. Objection: The commandment in Deut 8:8-10 only
speaks of saying a blessing after eating. How can we
derive the requirement of saying a blessing before
eating?
2. Rebuttal: The requirement of saying a blessing before
eating may be deduced logically. If one says a blessing
after eating, when he is full, will he not say a blessing
before eating, when he is still hungry?
We now raise an objection to the first solution of the original
problem (C.I).
Objection: Even if one takes the position that all planted crops
are subject to the law of fourth year produce, then still one may
derive from hlwlym only the requirement to say blessings over
planted crops. How can one derive the requirement of saying
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blessings over food that is not planted, such as meat, eggs or
fish?
We answer simultaneously the objection just posed at (E), and
the still unanswered objection of (D.2.e).
Answer: The extension to all food of the requirement to say
blessings before and after eating is based on a reasonable
supposition. It is reasonable to suppose that a person is forbidden to derive benefit from this world without saying a blessing.
3. Summary and Critique
Roger Brooks

My analysis of Abraham Weiss's5 comments is in two parts, a summary and a brief critique. As we shall see, Weiss provides his readers
with questions based on inconsistencies within the text. He then resolves
these textual difficulties by adducing the evidence of variant texts and
manuscripts. His goal, then, is to establish a reliable version of the passage, not through harmonization or contradictions, but on the basis of
solid textual evidence. With this new version in hand, Weiss gives us an
account of the text's history, explaining how the present, in his view,
corrupt, edition came into being. His program thus is well-rounded and
full, comprising questions, answers, and explanations.
Weiss begins his analysis by reviewing the passage's main question:
What is the Scriptural basis for the requirement of saying a blessing
before and after eating? According to Weiss, the simplest solution to this
question is provided by Lev 19:24, which states: "All fruit shall be holy,
[worthy of] praisegiving (hlwlym) to the Lord" (cf. B). Because the word
"praisegiving" appears in the plural form, the verse is suited to serve as
the basis for two blessings, one before the meal and one after. The
Talmud's ensuing discussion (C-O), we recall, rejects this straightforward
solution. Rather it claims that one of the two "praisegivings" mentioned
in Lev 19:24 is used to derive the restrictions applying to four-year-old
vines (D-I). As explained above (cf. I), the plural "praisegivings" can
serve as the basis for at most two laws. It therefore no longer is possible
to derive from this single word blessings before and after the meal.
With this summary of the pericope's basic issues in hand, Weiss
raises two logical questions, which we shall take up in turn. Weiss's first
question concerns the statement at H, that Lev 19:24 justifies blessings
before and after the meal, even if one of the "praisegivings" already has
been used to derive the restrictions of fourth year produce. This lemma,
Weiss claims, poses a problem, since a parallel case, M-O, gives rise to a
5 Weiss's comments to this section are found in an untitled article that appeared in
Horeb, Vol. 10:19-20, pp. 1-6.
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quite different response. At M-O, we recall, one of Lev 19:24's two
"praisegivings" has been used as the scriptural basis for the restrictions o
a four-year-old wine. As a result, only one "praisegiving" remains from
which to derive the two blessings, before and after eating. This, 0;
course, is precisely the same shortage of scriptural prooftexts as at
Within the logic of the Talmud, Lev 19:24 ought to be adequate justification for only one blessing, the one after the meal (so O). Thus the
Talmud quite logically asks (O), "Whence does one derive the requirement to say a blessing before eating?" Why, Weiss wishes to know, does
this same problem not arise at H, a lemma that presents precisely the
same situation?
Weiss's second question arises because the Talmud overlooks an obvious solution to its basic problem. At issue, we recall, is how to find scriptural
bases for two blessings, assuming that one of Lev 19:24's "praisegivings"
already has been used to derive the restrictions of four-year-old vines. The
answer, it seems to Weiss, should be found in Deut 8:10, which states, "You
shall eat and be full, and then bless the Lord your God." Later in this very
pericope (U), the verse provides an adequate basis for the requirement to
bless after the meal. The single remaining "praisegiving" would justify the
blessing before the meal. The question, then, is why the Talmud does not
appeal to Deut 8:10 in order to solve its problem.
Before turning to Weiss's solutions, let us ask how Weiss frames his
questions. Weiss's inquiries are entirely fitting to the nature and scope of
his source, for they derive from his identification of logical gaps or
inconsistencies in the text. Because of a contradiction between two stichs
(H and M), Weiss isolates a problem requiring his attention as an exegete. That is to say, the text itself determines what questions are deemed
important.
In the next step of his argument, Weiss disposes of those two problems in a single motion. He adduces a parallel version of the passage,
contained in the Florence manuscript:
Printed Edition
N. If one does not accept the
gezerah shavah, then from
what [scriptural verse can the
law that one must say]
blessings [over food be
derived]? [Without the gezerah
shavah, we recall, one is
forced to base more than two
laws on the word
"praisegiving" in Lev 19:24.]

Codex Florence
1. [Let us assume that we deal
with a case in which] one does
not use a gezerah shavah.
[Again, the result is that no
"praisegivings" remain from
which to derive the rules of
blessings.]
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O. And even if one does
accept the gezerah shavah
[leaving a single "praisegiving"
from which to derive the two
blessings],
granted that [in this case] one
must say] a blessing after [eating, because of Deut 8:10's
injunction].

2. Granted that [in this case]
one must say] a blessing after
[eating, because of Deut 8:10's
injunction].

From what [scriptural verse
can one derive the requirement to say a blessing] before
[eating]?

3. From what [scriptural verse
can one derive the requirement to say a blessing] before
[eating]?

The Florence manuscript differs from the standard printed version
only at O. MS Florence lacks the first clause of O, and so refers only to a
case in which neither of the two "praisegivings" mentioned in Lev 19:24
is available for the purpose of justifying blessings before or after the
meal. One of the "praisegivings" is used as the basis for the restrictions of
fourth year produce in general. The other is taken as indicating the
specific injunction concerning four-year-old vines. According to Codex
Florence, both "praisegivings" have been assigned to these other laws,
and so Lev 19:24 has no relationship to the requirement to bless over
food at all.
Weiss claims that this variant reading solves the pericope's two problems. As we recall, the first problem arises when we compare the statements at H and M-O. In both cases, according to the printed edition, a
single "praisegiving" remains from which to derive two blessings. Nevertheless, one case (H) gives rise to "no difficulties," while the other (M-O)
draws in its wake a lengthy explanation (P-Q). The Florence manuscript, for its part, posits a situation at M (unlike that of H) in which
there are no "praisegivings" at all from which to derive the laws of blessings. The two cases actually refer to separate circumstances, and so the
logical contradiction within the passage is eliminated.
Weiss's second question also is answered by reading the passage in
line with the Florence manuscript. Deut 8:10, ignored by the printed
version, now is taken as the proof text for blessing after eating. The statement that we can derive from Scripture the requirement to bless after
meals (2) must refer to Deut 8:10, for Lev 19:24 is completely unavailable as a proof text.
With these problems and their solutions in hand, Weiss now proceeds to the next logical question, how did the printed version of the text
come into being? That is to say, he provides us with an account of the
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text's history. Weiss posits that the Florence manuscript represents thei
original version of the text. At some point, a copyist added a margin a j|
gloss, "And if one does accept the gezerah shavah ..."(= first clause of
O). This note was intended to set up the entire discussion following
turning from a case in which Lev 19:24 is unavailable as a prooftext (J
Q) to a case in which one "praisegiving" remains (R-II). The note, then
should have been attached to the beginning of R. Instead, Weiss clairns
the phrase was erroneously added before O, for both stichs (O and R)
begin, "Granted that. . . ." Had the note been placed properly, the passage would read:
O. [If one does not accept the gezerah shavah, so that no praisegivings remain], granted that [he must say a blessing] after [eating,
because of Deut 8:10's injunction]. Whence [does one derive the
requirement to say a blessing] before [eating] . . . ?
R. And even if one does accept the gezerah shavah, granted that [the
law of blessings applies to] wine. Whence [does one derive the
requirement to bless] all other sorts of food?

Instead, of course, the phrase was misplaced, creating the present version
of the text, with all its complications.
Let us now evaluate Weiss's approach. His questions prove him to be
a sophisticated and insightful exegete. His lines of inquiry are determined solely from a straightforward reading of the text. Furthermore,
Weiss's solutions to these problems are inductive. He answers textual
questions on the basis of solid evidence, not of a priori assumptions. His
use of MS Florence provides him with facts that resolve the text's problems. In short, his answers are not mere announcements that a line or
section is out of place. Rather he presents carefully reasoned attempts to
regain the logically consistent text that he believes underlies the sometimes corrupt printed edition. Finally, it is noteworthy that Weiss's analysis is comprehensive. He succinctly notes the text's problems, and then
provides answers. This is followed by his account of how the text before
us might have developed. His reader thus is not left with isolated
remarks about this or that detail, but is led from the "original" version to
the text before us. Weiss's well-rounded work is highly satisfying, for he
asks precisely the question which all readers of the Talmud pose: How
do we make sense of the text before us?

